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KENTUCKY LAW JomNALV
THE KENTUCKY WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT:
EMPLOYEE V. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
The scope of the term "employe" as used in KRS §342.005(1) is
not defined by the statute. The section does enumerate certain
occupations to be included or excluded from the act, but there is no
attempt to establish a standard or test by which specific contractual
relationships, under which work is done by one person for another,
may be considered as within or without the statute.' Thus the question
whether a particular worker is an employee within the meaning of
the statute is left to be determined by the court. In this paper
decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals will be considered in an
endeavor to discover the test or tests used by the court in defining
"employe". A conclusion will be sought as to whether the court has
satisfactorily construed and implemented the term "employe" as used
in the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act, the general purpose
of which is to spread the burden of the cost of industrial injuries
through the medium of a higher sales price for the product produced
in the particular industry.2
KRS 342.004 directs that Chapter 342 be liberally construed on
questions of law. Such a direction would enable the Kentucky court
to take a position similar to that taken by the United States Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.3 and United States v. Silk4
where the Court conceived what some writers5 have called the eco-
nomic reality doctrine. Larson, after first stating the orthodox attitude
towards the "employee concept", explains the newer view by saying:
[J]ust as the 'servant' concept was tailored to fit a particular purpose-
the definition of the scope of a master's vicarious tort liability-, so
the term 'employee' when used in social and labor legislation should
be interpreted in the light of the purpose of the legislation. That is,
if the need being met by the legislation is regulation of collective
bargaining, the term 'employee' may well include all workers for
whom such bargaining is normal and appropriate; and if the evil
aimed at by the legislation is insecurity confronting workers who may
undergo temporary unemployment, the term 'employee' should include
workers who, as a matter of economic reality, are subject to that
hazard... .6
1 Ky. Rev. Stat. §342.005 (1) (1960). (Hereinafter cited as KRS).
2 See, 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, §2.20 (1952).
3 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
4 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
5 Jacob, "Are 'Independent Contractors' Really Independent?," 3 De Paul L.
Rev. 23, 41 (1953); 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 2, §43.41.6 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 2, §43.41, at P28,
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Congress later countered the Hearst case by enacting the Taft-
Hartley Act7 which specifically excluded independent contractors
from the definition of the term "employee" as used in the act.8 Any
interpretation of the Silk case which purported to relax the common
law rule was met by the so-called Gearheart resolution9 which amended
the Social Security Act10 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.11
The effect of this amendment seems to have been to reaffirm the
restrictive view taken by the earlier cases. 12 A major argument for the
Gearheart resolution was that the extension of social security coverage
through the "economic reality" doctrine should have been put forth
by Congress rather than the courts or the administrative bodies.13
Because of KRS 342.004 this argument would not arise if the Ken-
tucky court were to adopt the "economic reality" doctrine as its test
for construing the term "employe".14
A striking illustration of the flexibility of the economic reality
doctrine is shown by a comparison of Walling v. American Needle-
crafts, Inc.15 and Glenn v. Beard.16 The cases present almost identical
facts but reach opposite results as to the finding of an employment
status. It would seem that in reaching these apparently irreconcilable
results the "economic reality" doctrine must have been accepted.
KRS 342.004 was enacted in 1950.1' The Kentucky court has
mentioned the section while considering the general scope of the
Workmen's Compensation Act,'8 but there appears to have been only
7 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 151-166
(1958).8 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. 152 (3)
(1958).
0 Employment Taxes and Social Security Benefits-Status Quo, 62 Stat. 438
(1948), Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §1607(i) ((now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,§83306(i) ).
[Blut [the] term [employee] does not include (1) any individual who,
under the usual common-law rules applicable in determining the
employer-employee relationship; has the status of an independent
contractor or (2) any individual (except an officer of a corporation)
who is not an employee under such common-law rules....
10 Employment Taxes and Social Security Benefits-Status Quo, 62 Stat. 438
(1948).
M11 int. Rev. Code of 1939, §1607(i) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §3306
'12 Willcox, "The Coverage of Unemployment Compensation Laws," 8 Vand.
L. Rev. 245, 254 (1955).
13 Id. at 252, n.25. The argument rests on the assumption that Congress had
originally intended that the control test be used.
14 KRS 342.004 would at least meet the argument that, by adopting the
"economic reality" doctrine, the court would be invading a legislative power. The
"economic reality" doctrine may still remain objectionable in substance, as an
unsuitable application of KRS 342.004.
15 139 F. 2d 60 (6th Cir. 1943).
16 141 F. 2d 376 (6th Cir. 1944).
17 Ky. Acts 1950, ch. 187, §7, at 709.18 McCorkle v. McCorkle, 265 S.W. 2d 779 (Ky. 1954); Dick v. International
liarvester Co., 310 S.W. 2d 514 (Ky. 1958).
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one attempt to apply it in a consideration of a particular employment
status.' 9 Rather, the court has continued to apply the orthodox
vicarious liability test of control exerted over the employment rela-
tionship by the employer.20 The various factors to be considered in
the application of the test are stated in section 220 (2) of the
Restatement of Agency.21 A recent illustration of the devotion of the
Kentucky court to the use of the control test is shown in a 1959 case,
Locust Coal Company v. Bennett,22 where the court states that the
factors traditionally used for determining the employment status are
those contained in Restatement of Agency §220 (2). The court then
sets out §220 (2) in full and without further discussion decides the
case.2 3 This seems to preclude any thought that some other test might
better serve the purposes of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation
Act. However, there are different implications in other cases.
'9 Brewer v. Millich, 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1955); the absence of application
of KRS 342.004 is illustrated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Milliken in New
Independent Tobacco Warehouse, No. 3 v. Latham, 282 S.W. 2d 846, 849
(Ky. 1955).2 0 Diamond Block Coal Co. Sparks, 209 Ky. 73, 272 S.W. 31 (1925),
presents an early statement of the coitrol test. A recent case applying the test is
New Independent Tobacco Warehouse, No. 3 v. Latham, 282 S.W. 2d 846 (Ky.
1955).
21 Restatement, Agency §220 (1933).
Definition of servant:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance
of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentali-
ties, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer; and
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation-
ship of master and servant.
223 25 S.W. 2d 322 (Ky. 1959). Claimant was a coal truck driver who was
permanently injured when his truck overturned. Claimant used his own truck and
paid the expenses of its operation. He worked only when the truck of the coal
company could not handle all of the production. He was paid seventy cents per
ton hauled and his earnings varied from $7.00 to $100.00 per week. He was told
where to haul the coal and was at times required to help load the truck. There
was testimony to the effect that claimant assumed that he was covered by Work-
mens Compensation. The coal company reserved the right to terminate the
agreement.
V3 Ibid,
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In Brewer v. Millich,2 4 where the question was whether a particular
worker was an employee within the act, the court said:
In answering this question, the approach to be used is that of
determining the relation of employer-employee under the Workmen's
Compensation Act rather than of master and servant or principal and
agent in tort actions. The workmen's compensation approach is
broader and uses a more liberal construction favoring the employee.
This is in harmony with the purpose of the Act in affording protection
to the employee because of his inability to withstand the burdens of
injury occasioned by his employment and the resultant loss of work.25
The court decided that claimant was an employee despite the presence
of a contract which seemed to call for a finding of independent
contractorship. 2  The contract was treated as a sham created for
the purpose of hiding the true relationship which was that of employer-
employee.27 Thus the court seems to hold that the true nature of the
employment relationship 28 should control the finding rather than the
absence or presence of surface factors of control.29 In New Inde-
pendent Tobacco Warehouse, No. 8 v. Latham, decided in the same
year as Brewer v. Millich, the court seems to follow the Brewer theory
that the employment status is determined by looking to the true
nature of the actual relationship, in holding that an architect was an
independent contractor.30 The court said that the control test gov-
erned and that upon application of this test it was obvious that the
architect was an independent contractor.31 However, as pointed out
in the dissent, the factors pointing toward independent contractorship
24 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1955). Claimant had contracted to cut and further
process certain trees for a stave manufacturer. The contract provided that claimant
as an independent contractor was to hire his own men, make his own payroll,
make and report deductions of social security, withholding tax, and Kentucky
unemployment tax, and pay same to the proper authorities. It was further pro-
vided that the claimant was to use care in cutting, manufacturing and delivering
the bourbon stave bolts, and should he fail to do so as instructed by the manu-
facturer of staves, then the manufacturer of staves had the right to cancel and
take over the contract. Claimant was to be paid $35.00 per cord for all bourbon
stave bolts delivered and accepted.25 Brewer v. Millich, supra note 24, at 15.
26 A finding of independent contractorship is indicated by a consideration of
the form of the contract, the method provided for payment, and the fact that the
contract provided that claimant was to hire his own helpers and make his own
payroll.
27 Brewer v. Millich, 276 S.W. 2d 12, 17 (Ky. 1955).
28 The court points out the position of the employer as a manufacturer while
the claimant was a mere worker without capital with which to engage in business.
Brewer v. Millich, supra note 27 at 18.29 Accord, Partin-Lambdin Lumber Co. v. Frazier, 808 S.W. 2d 792 (Ky.
1957).
30282 S.W. 2d 846 (Ky. 1955). The worker was in the category of a
professional man, who specialized in the design and supervision of construction of
tobacco warehouses.
31 New Independent Tobacco Warehouse, No. 3 v, Latham, supra note 30, at
848, 849.
1961]
KENruc y LAw JouNAL[
did not seem so decisive as to demand a reversal of the Board's finding
that the architect was an employee.3 2 Thus the negative implication
of the decision is that, despite the factors of control present which
would reasonably warrant deciding that the architect was an em-
ployee, the Workmen's Compensation Act is simply not intended to
cover jobs of this character.33 This decision, while probably reaching
the correct result, displays the inherent conflict present in using the
control test in applying legislation, the purpose of which is to attack
an entirely different problem from that for which the control test was
originally developed.34
The confusion in reasoning and result arising from such a conflict
is further illustrated by four recent cases involving an employment
relationship which is often found in the Kentucky coal fields. The
fact situation in Sigmon Ikerd Co., Inc. v. Napier 5 is representative
of the employment relationship of the claimants in these cases. There
the claimant was a coal truck driver occupied in hauling coal from a
stripping operation to certain specified ramps. He owned his truck
and paid all the expenses involved in its operation including the salary
of a driver when he did not drive the truck personally. Claimant was
paid by the defendant on a tonnage basis for the coal hauled. The
defendant retained the right to terminate the arrangement at any time
and to choose the place where the coal was to be loaded and unloaded.
Claimant did not have regular working hours and was under no
obligation to haul any certain amount of coal. He was injured while
hauling coal from defendant's stripping operation to a conveyor. The
Workmen's Compensation Board found that claimant was an inde-
pendent contractor and dismissed his application for compensation.
The circuit court reversed, holding that claimant was an employee
of the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court
and affirmed the order of the Workmen's Compensation Board. The
court conceded that many details of the employment relationship
were indefinite, but went ahead to find claimant to be an independent
contractor, emphasizing the following factors:36 (1) method of pay-
ment, (2) hiring and payment of a driver by claimant, and (3) pay-
ment of the expenses of the operation of the truck by claimant. In
passing, the court cited Johnson v. Byrne & Speed Coal Corp.,37 a
321d. at 849.
33 The obvious economic independence of the architect seems inescapable.
34 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 2, §43.42.
35 297 S.W. 2d 917 (Ky. 1956).36 Accord, Hacker v. Hacker, 296 S.W. 2d 713 (Ky. 1956) where the court
relied on the Napier case; Locust Coal Co. v. Bennett, 325 S.W. 2d 322 (Ky. 1959).
See comment on the Bennett case in 48 Ky. L.J. 485 (1960).
37 271 Ky. 216, 111 S.W. 2d 67 (1937).
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vicarious liability case, where the Workmen's Compensation Act was
not before the court.
In Cutshin Coal Co. v. Campbell, 8 the court held a coal truck
driver to be an employee even though the employment relationship in
question was very similar to the one before the court in the Napier
case.30 The court stated that the principles announced in Brewer v.
Millich4" and Partin-Lambdin Lumber Co. v. Frazier4' were con-
trolling and distinguished the Napier42 case and Hacker v. Hacker13
upon three points. In the latter two cases: "(1) the trucker was
engaged in an independent business, (2) the Board found the
claimant was not an employee, and (3) the element of estoppel was
not present."44 The fact that the driver had been regularly engaged
by the coal mining company for seven years in performing an integral
part of the business is emphasized as indicating there was in fact an
employer-employee relationship.
The seriousness of the problem created by decisions such as the
Campbell case is emphasized by a further consideration of the position
occupied by the coal truck drivers in the Kentucky coal fields. Gen-
erally these trucking operations are one-man endeavors marked by
the circumstance of almost complete economic dependence upon the
particular mining company concerned. Sometimes the driver-owners
are allowed to buy "company" trucks by reimbursing the company from
payments received during their initial hauling operations. The right
to terminate the hauling agreement is usually retained by the com-
pany. In almost all cases the drivers are performing an essential part
of the business in hauling the coal from the mining operation to the
tipple.45 Thus it seems that there has developed a definite "class"
of workers within the industry, who would ordinarily be unable to
bear the financial responsibility for injuries peculiar to the industry.
Coverage by the Workmen's Compensation Act would seem to follow
such a conclusion. However, in three of the four cases decided by the
8 09 S.W. 2d 89 (Ky. 1957).31)The Napier case could have been distinguished upon an element of
estoppel found in the Campbell case.
40 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1955).
41 308 S.W. 2d 792 (Ky. 1957).
42 297 S.W. 2d 917 (Ky. 1956).
43 296 S.W. 2d 713 (Ky. 1956).
44 Cutshin Coal Co. v. Campbell, 809 S.W. 2d 39, 40 (Ky. 1957). The
element of estoppel could probably have controlled the decision, but it will not
be further discussed as it is not important to the reasoning of the court.
45The Kentucky "truck" mines operate without rail facilities from the mining
operation to the tipple. In the year ending December 31, 1959 there were 2,540
truck mines operating in Kentucky. During the same period 178 rail mines were
operating in Kentucky. The rail mines employed 15,813 men while the truck
mines employed 20,071. See 1959 Kentucky Dept of Mines and Minerals
Annual Report at 20.
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court, the coal truck driver was held to be an independent contractor.
In the three decisions holding the drivers to be independent con-
tractors the reasoning of the court is based upon a broad application
of the control test with all the factors adding up to a conclusion of
independent contractorship. However, in the case finding the driver
to be an employee, the court seems to point out the factors of duration
of employment and integral part of the business as being decisive of
the question. As the employment relationship of the drivers in all four
cases is basically the same, an emphasis on their participation in an
integral part of the business would seem to require a conclusion that
all were employees. Yet, the Kentucky court has failed to so find.4
Thus, it seems that while the court asserts that the control test
governs, its application in the cases has resulted in somewhat different
implications in certain situations. On the one hand, there is the
situation where the court ascertains the composite factors indicating
control with resulting conclusions, which often makes prediction
difficult because of differences of opinion as to the relevancy of the
factors under consideration. This is exemplified by Locust Coal Co. v.
Bennett.47 On the other hand, there is the situation where, instead of
ascertaining the factors indicating control, the court determines the
true nature of the contractual relationship, as exemplified by the
Brewer case where the court struck aside an employment contract
because it was a mere subterfuge created to shift the responsibility for
injuries to the employees. 48
In certain instances, the court has diverged from what it calls the
control test to a reliance upon a theory more germane to the purposes
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The emphasis upon the integral
nature of the work performed in the Campbell, Brewer and Frazier
cases represents a theory based upon a social policy to spread coverage
to all members of the economic class intended to be benefited by the
act. Thus coverage under the act depends upon what the worker's
actual status is within the particular economic endeavor and not upon
a summation of the surface factors of control which are absent and
those which are present. Recognition that such factors as (1) eco-
nomic dependence of the worker upon the employment (employer),
46 If the "integral part of the business" test is used, the duration of the
individual employment would seem irrelevant in itself, as the trucking operations
would be an integral part of the business whether the individual driver worked
one day or seven years. See, comment, 48 Ky. L.J. 485 (1960).
47 825 S.W. 2d 822 (Ky. 1959).
4 8 Brewer v. Millich, 276 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1955); see 1 Larson, op. cit. supra
note 2, §45.10, where there is a discussion of a trend towards disguising certain
employment status' particularly in the peripheral areas of the modem business
enterprise.
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(2) inability of the individual to bear the financial burden of industrial
injuries and (3) primary reliance by the worker upon a single source
of work are the important considerations in workmen's compensation
litigation over the employment status would eliminate the need for
the use of the orthodox control test.
The more liberal attitude49 found in some of the Kentucky cases
is probably an indication that Kentucky is following a trend pointed
out by Larson when he says:
[W]ith the vast amount of leeway within the common-law definition
(control test) itself, what is happening with increasing frequency is
that the weight accorded the different factors of the definition is
subtly influenced by the court's conception of the evil to be corrected
and, accordingly, of the class of persons who actually need the pro-
tection afforded by the legislation. As a result, although many courts
if required to do so by a technical interpretation of the employee
concept will still exclude from the act classes of workers while
admitting that they need compensation protection as much as anyone,
the overall development of compensation law shows that the concept
has been broadened and altered (and in rare instances even nar-
rowed) to fit the peculiar needs and purposes of compensation law.50
Thus the difficulty of ascertaining the test that the Kentucky court
in fact uses to decide the employee-independent contractor question
is a significant obstacle facing counsel for either claimant or employer.
In the interests of consistency in theory and of predictability, the court
should adopt a test which is more germane to the purposes of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. While the purpose of the common-
law control test as applied to master-servant relationships is to
delimit the scope of a master's vicarious tort liability, in contrast the
Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned more particularly with
the injuries which occur to the employee through acts of co-employees
or third parties.5' Such injuries are an industrial fact of life recognized
as a by-product of mechanical production methods. Where these in-
juries are involved, the applicability of the vicarious liability control
test seems irrelevant.52
A test which would be more conducive to the accomplishment of
the ultimate purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is the
"relative nature of the work test".s3 The test has a double emphasis:
(1) the nature of the claimant's work and (2) the relation of that
49See Brewer v. Millich, supra note 48; Cutshin Coal Co. v. Campbell, 309
S.W. 2d 39 (Ky. 1957); Partin-Lambdin Lumber Co. v. Frazier, 808 S.W. 2d 792
(Ky. 1957).
50 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 2, §43.41, at 629.
51 Id. at §43.42.
52 Ibid.
53 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 2, §43.50.
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work to the employer's work.54 Larson enumerates the significant in-
gredients as being:
[Tihe character of the claimant's work or business-how skilled it is,
how much of a separate calling or enterprise it is, to what extent it
may be expected to carry its own accident burden and so on-and its
relation to the employer's business, that is, how much it is a regular
part of the employer's regular work, whether it is continuous or
intermittent, and whether the duration is sufficient to amount to the
hiring of continuing services as distinguished from contracting for
the completion of a particular job.55
Larson would find a presumptive area of intended protection
where the services of any worker form a regular and continuing part
of the cost of the product and where the worker's method of operation
is not such an independent business that it forms in itself a separate
route through which his own costs of industrial injury can be chan-
neled.56 Under such a formula the Kentucky coal truck drivers would
seem presumptively to be employees. Furthermore, the court would
have encountered no difficulty in categorizing the architect in the
Latham case as an independent contractor.
The "relative nature of the work" test may prove inadequate in
certain instances. However, such a test would be more suitable
for determining the employment status than the control test which
was developed for an entirely different purpose. The adoption
of the "relative nature of the work" test would improve the pre-
dictability of employment relationships in those situations where
the factors of control seem to warrant a finding of employer-
employee status, but where the worker involved is not within the
economic class intended to be protected by the social purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, in those situations
where the worker involved is within the economic class intended to
be protected by the social purpose of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, but where the factors of control, as applied in the orthodox man-
ner, do not call for a finding of the employer-employee status, an
application of the "relative nature of the work" test would avoid the
necessity of resorting to a fiction or placing an undue emphasis upon
an isolated factor of the control test.
In the interests of predictability for both employer and claimant
and in order that the Workmen's Compensation Act may better serve
the purpose for which it was enacted, the "relative nature of the work"
test should be adopted by the court in the consideration of the
applicability of the act to individual employment relationships.
Richard W. Spears
54 Id. at §43.52. 55 Ibid.
56 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 2, §43.51.
